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Abstract 
Entry of new firms, both in the form of entrepreneurs and corporations, fosters competition 
and productivity. The entry of firms and productivity have both been low in the Spanish 
economy over recent years. This paper analyses the determinants of entry focusing on the 
role of the design and efficacy of enforcement institutions (the judicial system), an aspect 
traditionally overlooked. To do this, we exploit disaggregated data at the local level in Spain. 
We find that higher judicial efficacy increases the entry rate of firms, while it has no effect on 
the exit rate. Crucially, that impact only occurs in the case of the entry rates for entrepreneurs, 
defined as self-employed, but not in the case of limited liability corporations. This finding may 
be due to the fact that judicial (in)efficacy can be regarded as a fixed cost to be paid by the 
agents that litigate. Hence, the economic activity of entrepreneurs – and specifically, their 
entry into the market – is expected to be more affected than that of larger firms. 
Keywords: entrepreneurship, judicial efficacy, barriers to entry. 
JEL Classification:  L26, M13, K40, R12. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
La entrada de nuevas empresas, en la forma tanto de empresarios individuales como de 
grandes corporaciones, fomenta la competencia y la productividad de una economía. En este 
sentido, es necesario destacar que tanto la entrada de empresas como la productividad de la 
economía española han sido bajas durante los últimos años. Este trabajo analiza los 
determinantes de la entrada de nuevas empresas analizando específicamente el papel 
representado por el diseño y la eficacia de las instituciones de ejecución (el sistema judicial) al 
servicio de las empresas. Este aspecto ha sido excluido tradicionalmente de los estudios en 
la materia. Para este fin, analizamos datos desagregados a escala provincial en España, 
encontrando que una mayor eficacia del sistema judicial aumenta la tasa de entrada de 
empresas. La eficacia de la justicia, sin embargo, no parece tener efecto en la tasa de salida. 
El impacto positivo encontrado en la entrada solo se produce en el caso de los empresarios 
individuales, pero no en el caso de las sociedades anónimas o de responsabilidad  limitada 
(que tienen normalmente un tamaño superior). Este hallazgo puede explicarse por el hecho 
de que la (in)eficacia judicial puede ser considerada como un coste fijo que se ha de pagar 
por las empresas que litigan. Por tanto, la actividad económica de una pequeña empresa (o, 
concretamente, de un emprendedor individual) puede verse afectada relativamente más que 
la de una empresa de mayor tamaño. 
Palabras clave: emprendimiento empresarial, eficacia judicial, barreras de entrada. 
Códigos JEL: L26, M13, K40, R12. 
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1 Introduction 
Entry of new firms, either in the form of self-employed entrepreneurs or larger companies, 
such as limited liability corporations1
The positive impacts on productivity of higher entrepreneurship and entry of new 
firms have also been found for the case of Spain (see Martín Marcos and Jaumandreu, 2004 
for the case of the Spanish manufacturing firms). Specifically Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004) 
observed that new manufacturing firms in Spain are more likely to innovate compared to 
incumbents. In terms of TFP, Fariñas and Ruano (2004) confirmed that the replacement of 
exiting firms by entering new firms in Spain had a significant positive effect on TFP in 
manufacturing firms as well. 
, generates a competitive pressure on existing enterprises 
and it endows the market with the newest capital (Brandt, 2004 and López-García and 
Puente, 2007). Not surprisingly, Scarpetta et al. (2002) found evidence suggesting that the 
substitution of the most obsolete firms by new firms can stimulate productivity growth. 
Following Foster et al. (1998), around 25% of productivity growth in the U.S. manufacturing 
sector could be explained by the “net entry effect”, that is, the exit of less productive plants 
that are displaced by more productive entering firms. The impact on productivity could be 
explained by the fact that new businesses often emerge in areas related to ICT or R&D, as 
noted by Brandt (2004). In fact, she finds that the major differences in entry rates between the 
countries in her study are explained by the entry rates in ICT industries. Related to this, 
entrepreneurs, i.e., businessmen who own and run their firms, have been regarded as 
catalysts of economic change due to their capacity for innovation and risk-taking (Armour and 
Cumming, 2008).  
The study of entrepreneurship is important for the case of the Spanish economy for 
several reasons. First of all, the entry rate of new firms is low by international standards. 
Figure 1 shows the average entry rates (including all sectors for the period 2004-2010) in all 
European economies. Spain is below the European average and below all major economies 
with the exception of Italy.2 The results of López-García and Puente (2007) also show that 
entry rates in Spain are below those of the U.S. and Canada. Ardagna and Lussardi (2008), 
using GEM (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor) data show that the rate of Total Entrepreneurial 
Activity3
 
 is 5.23% in Spain, lower than the OECD average (6.65%) and the group of Civil Law 
countries average (8.36%). Moreover, Spain has been a country characterized by low 
productivity growth and low innovation (Mora-Sanguinetti and Fuentes, 2012) over the most 
recent years. 
 
                                                                            
1. As a clarification, the term "limited liability corporation" is used in this paper as opposed to the term "unlimited liability 
firm". The first term includes all those companies that have limited liability. In this sense, the term includes companies 
that are called both "sociedades anónimas" and "sociedades de responsabilidad limitada" under Spanish law.  
2. This result complements the findings of both Núñez (2004) and López-García and Puente (2007). These studies 
showed that the "turnover" of companies in Spain was lower than in other countries, especially due to the low rates of 
exit of firms. 
3. Calculated as an indicator that equals one if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a 
young firm. The result is expressed as a % of respondents answering yes to the question.  
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Figure 1: Entry rates, average 2004-2010 (international evidence) 
 
SOURCE: Eurostat Business Demography statistics. 
 
The literature has highlighted several factors that affect entrepreneurship, such access 
to credit and related liquidity constraints [Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Aghion et al. (2007), 
Samilaand and Sorenson (2011)], education (European Commission, 2012), the regulatory 
environment, in the form of taxation [Glenn Hubbard and Gentry (2000), Cullen and Gordon 
(2007), Djankov et al. (2010)]4
Nevertheless, an aspect that has been overlooked until very recently is contract 
enforcement, i.e., the efficacy of courts in making parties honour their contractual obligations. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are only three works refererring to the issue at the 
international level [Desai et al. (2005), Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) and Stephen et al. (2009) 
who used aggregate data when measuring contract enforcement at the national level] and 
two at the specific country level [Chemin (2009) and Lichand and Soares (2011) for Pakistan 
and Brasil respectively]. Those studies find that lower quality of contract enforcement (in the 
sense of slower tribunals, less trained judges or more “formal” systems depending on the 
study) has a negative impact on entrepreneurship. In the case of Ardagna and Lusardi (2008), 
the authors find that lower efficiency of the judicial system diminishes the positive effects of 
social networks, skills or labour force status for a multiplicity of countries. Desai et al. (2005) 
find that greater judicial interference and greater formalism of the judicial procedures are 
associated with lower entry of new firms in the market. They find that the effect is especially 
important for emerging markets (thus, the impact is lower in the case of developed western 
economies). Both Ardagna and Lusardi and Desai et al. utilized as a measure of judicial 
efficacy or quality of enforcement institutions the indicator proposed by Djankov et al. (2003) 
that inspired the Doing Business (DB) project (contract enforcement indicator) or the DB data 
directly. Those data are aggregate data at the country level, based on estimations (not real 
judicial efficacy data).  
, labour market regulations [Scarpetta et al. (2002), Botero et al. 
(2004), van Stel et al. (2007)], entry regulations [Djankov et al. (2002), Klapper et al. (2006), 
Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007), Branstetter et al. (2013)], forgiving personal bankruptcy laws 
[Audretsch (2002), Fan and White (2003), Armour and Cumming (2008)] and culture.  
                                                                            
4. See also Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello (2013) for a complete literature review on the specific issue. 
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For its part, Stephen et al. (2009) analyze the nature of the interplay between labour 
markets and enforcement institutions (although they also use the Djankov et al. 2003 
indicator). They find that the greater the formality of the country’s legal system, the less 
effective the (restrictive) labour regulations are, with the subsequent positive impact on 
entrepreneurship.  
This study shows that more effective courts in Spain, measured using real 
performance data at the local level, seem to promote the entry of entrepreneurs into the 
market. We concentrate on civil cases and, therefore, the problem studied is how the low 
enforcement of contractual obligations between private parties may discourage entry into the 
market. This study, therefore, uses real judicial efficacy measures in line with Chemin (2009) 
and Lichland and Soares (2011). Our data are obtained directly from the courts and allow us 
to differentiate the efficacy of the judicial system by province, subject and by procedure. 
Our methodology thus studies the potential impact of judicial efficacy on entry rates at 
the local level in Spain, after controlling for the economic cycle, factors that change very slowly 
over time such as culture, the provision of credit, the industry composition of the market and 
economic development. We also control for changing PMR (product market regulation) regimes 
at the region level and regional taxes. Another advantage of our approach is that an important 
determinant of entrepreneurship, the personal bankruptcy law, is set at the national level and 
does not change across Spanish regions, so our study can isolate the effects of other factors. 
Same should be said about the level of “formalism” (as the civil procedural rules are common to 
all provinces) and labour regulations (again, common to all provinces). 
Specifically, we find that higher judicial efficacy increases the entry rates of firms, 
while has no effect on exit rates. Crucially, that impact only occurs in the case of the entry 
rates of entrepreneurs, defined as self-employed, but not in the case of limited liability 
corporations. This finding may be explained by the fact that judicial (in)efficacy can be 
regarded as a fixed cost to be paid by the agents that litigate. Hence, the economic activity of 
entrepreneurs -and specifically, its entry into the market- is expected to be much more 
affected than that of larger limited liability companies.5 A large company may have on staff a 
legal department or a lawyer to deal with legal conflicts or compliance issues. However, this 
does not normally occur in a small business. That is, seeking legal assistance can be much 
more expensive in relative terms for small businesses.6
The study of the design of enforcement institutions and, in particular, the 
effectiveness of the judicial system is relevant for the Spanish case. Spain would hold the 
position 26 out of a total of 35 legal systems in its agility to resolve disputes before the first 
instance courts according to the recent results of the OECD (Palumbo et al. 2013). That is, 
although the position of Spain is in line with other civil Law countries such as France, it is 
worse than the average and lower than other European economies such as Germany or 
 
                                                                            
5. Our analysis crucially hinges on the fact that limited liability companies are larger than the businesses run by self-
employed individuals. See Appendix A for empirical evidence. Moreover, in Spain the creation of a limited liability 
company requires an initial capital (3000 euros for a "sociedad limitada" and 60000 in the case of a "sociedad 
anonima"). It should be noted that the sum of the limited liability companies and companies with unlimited liability, such 
as those founded by entrepreneurs individually, account for nearly 100% of companies in Spain. That is, there are some 
companies with a hybrid nature (“cooperativas” and “sociedades comanditarias”) but they are less than 1% of the total 
number of firms and are not considered in this study. 
6. The same argument can be found in the literature on the costs of "red tape" (OECD, 2001 or Nijsen and Vellinga, 2002). 
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Sweden. Even less favourable results can be found on the Doing Business (DB) Project of the 
World Bank in its "enforcing contracts" indicator, published since 2004. Spain ranked 64th 
among 185 countries covered in the reports of 2012 and 2013. Specifically, Spain would be 
in a worse position than other economies with similar levels of development such as the other 
big European economies (with the exception of Italy). These findings are in line with those of 
the Circulo de Empresarios (2003), which conducted a survey among Spanish companies on 
the state of Spanish justice. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a detailed analysis 
of both the entry and exit rates of firms in Spain at the local level, and the differences between 
entrepreneurship and other forms of entry in the market. It also presents the construction of 
the database measuring the efficacy of the judicial system used in this analysis. Section 3 
explains our identification strategy and Section 4 shows the main results. Finally, Section 5 
concludes and explains our findings. Some additional information can be found in several 
appendices. 
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2 Measuring the institutional environment and business demography in the 
         Spanish economy 
2.1 Measuring business demography 
With the aim of measuring business demography in Spain we use information on the 
number of firms, entries and exits by province and year over the period 2001-2009. These 
data come from the DIRCE database (Directorio Central de Empresas) constructed by the 
Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) and they are broken down by the legal form of the 
firm and by the province where its registered office is located.Therefore we can distinguish 
between newly created limited liability corporations (sociedades anónimas and sociedades 
limitadas under the Spanish Law) and self-employed individuals creating an enterprise (who 
have unlimited liability). With this information we can compute aggregate (all firms) entry and 
exits rates and also those for corporations and entrepreneurs (whose empirical counterpart 
are the self-employed) separately. As it was already explained, the entry and exit rates 
computed in this paper account for nearly 100% of the entry and exit of firms in Spain as 
we have only excluded firms with a hybrid nature under Spanish Law (sociedades 
cooperativas and sociedades comanditarias) which account to less than 1% of the total 
number of firms. 
The entry rate is defined as the number of firms that enter a market in a given 
year as a percentage of all the active firms in that market at the end of the year (which 
include the new and continuing firms). Consistently, the exit rate is defined as the number 
of firms that exit the market in a given year as a percentage of all the active firms in that 
market at the end of the year.  
Both entry and exit rates show sizeable variation across provinces and years in 
Spain. Aggregate entry rates range between the 15% of the province of Caceres and the 
8.2% of province of Soria (Figure 2), while aggregate exit rates range between the 11.8% of 
Gerona and the 7.6% of Soria (Figure 3).  Entry rates have decreased and exit rates have 
increased since the onset of the last recession (2007-2009), as shown in Figures 4 and 5, 
respectively. The exit rates of entrepreneurs have been systematically higher than those of 
corporations during the period of study (2001-2009), while there is no clear pattern in the 
case of entry rates. There is little correlation between entry and exit rates for all firms (0.01), 
while that correlation is moderately positive in the case of entrepreneurs (0.15) and negative 
for corporations (-0.22). The geographical and time distribution of entry and exit rates is 
shown in detail in Appendices B and C, respectively. In our empirical analyses the log 
transformation has been used for all entry and exit rates in order to correct for their skewed 
distributions7
 
.  
 
 
                                                                            
7. Moreover, there were some outliers. Specifically, the entry rates (both for corporations and self-employed) in the 
province of Caceres in 2001 were extremely high (see Appendix B). Those observations have been replaced by their 
province-means for the rest of years (2002-2009).  
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Figure 2: Entry rates (all firms): geographical variation (2001-2009 averages).  
 
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration using DIRCE (Directorio Central de Empresas) data from the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
 
Figure 3: Exit rates (all firms): geographical variation (2001-2009 averages).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration using DIRCE (Directorio Central de Empresas) data from the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
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  Figure 4: Entry rates: time variation (national means) 
 SOURCE: Self elaboration using DIRCE (Directorio Central de Empresas) data from the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
 
 
Figure 5: Exit rates: time variation (national means) 
SOURCE: Self elaboration using DIRCE (Directorio Central de Empresas) data from the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
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2.2 Constructing measures of judicial efficacy in Spain 
In order to measure judicial efficacy in Spain this paper constructs a set of efficacy measures 
at the local (provincial) level using direct information provided by the courts to the Spanish 
General Council of the Judiciary (Consejo General del Poder Judicial, hereinafter CGPJ). 
Specifically, the CGPJ database reports the number of cases filed, resolved and still 
pending in the Spanish judicial system by region, court, year, subject and procedure. 
Therefore, we will be able to distinguish the specific type of civil procedure used by the agents 
at the declaratory stage (ordinary judgment, verbal, monitory and exchange) or at the 
execution stage (see Figure 4 for further details). The database also provides information on 
the nature of the conflict (civil, penal, administrative or labour) and on the specific court in 
which the procedure takes place. Therefore constructing the indicators from the data is a 
complex issue. The following paragraphs explain how to build these efficacy measures.  
As an outline (see Figure 6), first we should identify the jurisdiction that deals with the 
conflicts which we consider most relevant for the functioning of a company and therefore 
could affect more directly the decision of entry into the market (and, in general, the incentives 
for entrepreneurship). Different types of conflicts are dealt with by different jurisdictions inside 
the judicial system in Spain, which are served by different groups of judges. Once that 
jurisdiction (orden jurisdiccional) has been identified, we must identify the specific court in 
which a company has to initiate proceedings in order to defend its interests and the specific 
procedure that must be used. 
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Figure 6: The Spanish judicial system 
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration. 
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Regarding the jurisdiction, a company in Spain may be confronted with very different 
types of conflicts in its daily functioning: labour legislation conflicts (which are dealt by the 
juzgados de lo social in Spain and are not considered “civil” unlike other European 
legislations), conflicts with the public administration, dealt by juzgados contencioso-
administrativos, criminal cases or civil conflicts which are those that may arise with other 
private firms (competitors or partners) or other private parties such as suppliers and 
customers. Examples of the latter conflicts include disputes concerning the interpretation of a 
contract, disagreements regarding the quality of products, or claims related to the intellectual 
property of a work or service. Those conflicts will be dealt with by civil courts (juzgados de lo 
civil). We focus the analysis on civil conflicts because we consider that such conflicts are the 
most relevant to the daily activity of companies and affect all areas of business. They are also 
the conflicts that are quantitatively more important. Moreover, civil Law legislation in Spain is 
considered supplementary on all other areas of Law.  
The civil jurisdiction (the relevant one for the cases explained above) is regulated by 
the Civil Procedural Law (CPL)8
The CPL also determines the specific procedure that must be used before the judge. 
There are different procedures depending on the amount involved or the subject. On one side 
there are ordinary judgments (juicios ordinarios), which will be used if the conflict involves a 
sum of at least 6,000 Euros or relates to certain matters (such as appeals against decisions of 
the governing bodies of the company). On the other hand, verbal judgments (juicios verbales) 
take place when the disputed amount is less than 6,000 Euros. Finally, there are simpler 
procedures deciding claims arising out of bills of exchange and cheques (juicios cambiarios) 
and simple payment procedures (juicios monitorios) that may be converted into verbal or 
ordinary judgments if the debtor defends the claim. Appeals against corporate decisions are 
normally made in Spain through the juicios ordinarios. Thus, we consider them to be the most 
interesting to analyze (as “representative” type of procedure).
 which regulates all civil conflicts in Spain. This Law 
establishes that a new conflict must enter the judicial system through the first instance courts 
(juzgados de primera instancia) and the first instance and instruction courts (juzgados de 
primera instancia e instrucción). It must be noted that some extrajudicial solutions may be 
found by the parties, such as sending the case to arbitration (Ley de Arbitraje). However, even 
in that case only a judge (thus, the judicial system) can enforce an arbitral decision (laudo). 
9 After the declaratory stage an 
execution judgment may have to take place.10
Using the raw data available from the CGPJ database, we have constructed a 
measure of efficacy for each court (that we have aggregated at the provincial level) and for 
each procedure (see Padilla et al. 2007, Mora-Sanguinetti, 2010 and 2012 or García-Posada 
and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2013): the congestion rate (see equation 1 below). 
  
 
ti
titi
ti resolvedCases
casesNewcasesPending
rateCongestion
,
,1,
,
+
= −
                            (1) 
   
                                                                            
8. Law 1/2000, of January 7th (Civil Procedural Law). 
9. Results for other procedures are available on request. 
10. Results of the estimation of the impact of this last step of the civil procedure are available upon request. 
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The congestion rate is defined as the ratio between the sum of pending cases 
(measured at the beginning of the period) plus new cases in a specific year and the cases 
resolved in the same year. A lower congestion rate is related to greater efficacy of the judicial 
system. For instance, an average congestion rate of 2.52 in Sevilla over the period 2001–
2009 indicates that around two and a half cases (summing up the pending cases and the 
new cases arriving to the courts of Sevilla in a specific year) were awaiting resolution while the 
courts were able to resolve just one.  
Although the CGPJ performance data of the civil courts are available for the period 
1995-2010, we must use only data from 2001 onwards as the civil procedural Law (and thus 
the procedures themselves) changed in 2000 (Mora-Sanguinetti, 2010). 
We have aggregated the data at the provincial level,11
With respect to territorial competence, the CPL also establishes the relevant rules.  
As a general rule, claims are entered at the place of the registered office of the defendant.
 although more 
disaggregated data on the judicial system are available. This is due to the lack of more 
disaggregated data on other important variables such as income per capita (e.g. there is no 
disaggregated data for the GDP of the city of Madrid or the city of Getafe, both part of the 
province of Madrid, but we have the GDP for the Madrid province as a whole). In terms of 
the analysis, this has the drawback of losing the “sub-provincial” action in the decision of 
the agents. That is, enterprise management decisions may be different depending on 
whether the company operates in a congested zone (for instance the city of Madrid) or in a 
less congested one (surroundings).  
12
Finally, access to aid programmes for the creation of new companies in Spain is 
closely related to the petitioner's residence while these programs tend to be managed by 
regional or even local administrations. 
 
However, if the dispute concerns the annual accounts of the company, the court must be that 
of the province where the company has its registered office, and the same rule generally 
applies to bankruptcy proceedings. If the claim relates to real assets (i.e., buildings), the 
conflict will be resolved at the place where the real assets are located. Moreover, in the case 
of small firms (the vast majority of the Spanish businesses), most of their trade (and 
negotiations with other companies) occurs within one province.  
13 For example, an entrepreneur cannot apply for 
support to entrepreneurship in Seville if she wants to create a business in Madrid. Also, the 
company must be located in ”San Sebastian de los Reyes" (a municipality of the region of 
Madrid) if the manager wants to apply for a grant of the city council.14
It is necessary to clarify that the CPL establishes the formal rules that the parties 
must observe, the role of the judge, the rules governing evidence, the control by superior 
courts and all related issues. Therefore that Law is a main determinant of the aggregate 
efficacy of the judicial system in Spain. However, although the CPL is a national Law, the 
efficacy of courts may differ among Spanish provinces due to supply and demand factors. 
 All these rules lead us 
to consider that studying the judicial system at a local/provincial (rather than national) level is 
relevant to the production cycle of companies. 
                                                                            
11. Excluding Ceuta and Melilla (no information is available for those cities). 
12. Articles 50 and 51 of the CPL. 
13. As an example: Decree-Law 8/2013 of Andalusia of May 28, de medidas de creacion de empleo y fomento del 
emprendimiento. 
14. Ordenanza (AGES 2013) reguladora de la concesión de subvenciones a pequeñas y medianas empresas de San 
Sebastián de los Reyes para la generación de empleo neto. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 18 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1405 
On the supply side, the resources invested in the justice administration differ, at least at the 
regional level.15
 
 In the allocation of resources between different geographical units, the 
administration favours the population whose needs may not specifically reflect a particular 
type of conflict, its relative growth or its complexity (Fabbri et al. 2010, Mora-Sanguinetti, 
2012). On the demand side, litigation propensity may differ among provinces. This 
geographical variation in efficacy is illustrated in Figure 7, which shows the average 
congestion rate for ordinary judgments. For greater clarity, Figure 8  graphs  the results of 
the congestion rate of ordinary judgments for some of the provinces over the period 
considered (see Appendix D for a detailed table). There was, on average, a difference of 
1.16 congestion points between the most efficient (Alava) and the least efficient (Alicante) 
province throughout the period.  
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration using Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ) data. 
 
 
                                                                            
15. The Spanish regions (Comunidades Autónomas) have some powers related to the administration of justice: Even 
though the judicial power is not properly transferred to the regions, management of judicial resources is influenced by 
the policies developed by the regions. For instance, they decide how much money is invested in new courts each year in 
their territories, even though the new courts are integrated into a system that is centrally governed. 
Figure 7: Congestion rate: geographical variation  
 
>= 2.582.12 TO 2.391.92 TO 2.120 TO 1.92 2.39 TO 2.58
2001-2009
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Figure 8: Congestion rate: time variation 
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration using Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ) data. 
 
2.3 Control variables 
As discussed in the introduction, there is a wide array of factors that may affect business 
demography and entrepreneurship. We attempt to control for them through the following 
variables and our identification strategy.  
We include GDP (in logs) as a measure of market size16
It is also necessary to control for industrial composition because entry and exit rates 
vary across industries due to factors such as fixed costs, the degree of competition and the 
elasticity of demand
. We control for 
unemployment rate as, on the one hand, higher unemployment reduces the demand for 
goods and services and in turn deters entry but, on the other hand, higher unemployment 
reduces the chances of finding a salaried job, which incentivizes self-employment. Credit 
constraints seem to affect firm entry and they are themselves a function of the efficiency of 
the legal system (Levine, 1998, La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, Desai et al. 2005, Ponticelli, 
2012). Therefore, we include banking credit to GDP ratio (Credit/GDP), the number of bank 
branches per 1,000 persons (Branches), the non-performing loans ratio of credit institutions 
(Npl ratio) and the ratio of defaulted accounts receivable to GDP (Dar/GDP). Banking credit to 
GDP ratio and branches per capita are standard measures of financial development (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995, Giacomelli and Menon, 2012). We expect higher ratios to be associated 
with less financial constraints. The ratio of defaulted accounts receivable to GDP is an 
alternative proxy of credit constraints that focuses on trade credit instead of banking credit 
(Padilla et al. 2007). A higher ratio means, ceteris paribus, lower incentives for borrowers to 
repay –probably because of poor creditor protection or contract enforcement- which causes 
more credit rationing. The same reasoning applies to the non-performing loans ratio.  
17
                                                                            
16. In several experiments we have used the province’s population (in logs) instead. Same results were found, as the 
correlation between the two variables is 0.97. GDP per capita has also been used in some specifications, yielding similar 
results. It has finally been dropped to avoid collinearity with GDP.   
. To capture industrial composition, we compute the ratio of the gross 
value added of the main five industries (primary sector, energy, manufacturing, construction, 
services) over the total gross value added of each province. 
17. See López-García and Puente (2006) for evidence on Spain.  
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We also control for other market characteristics, such as the degree of vertical 
integration and the average level of capital intensity. Highly vertically integrated firms may be 
less harmed by judicial inefficacy, as they rely less on the judicial system to enforce contracts 
with suppliers and customers (Johnson et al., 2002). Capital intensive firms may also be less 
affected by poor contract enforcement as, at least in developed economies such as Spain, 
the legal system may be good enough to protect the physical capital (as its measurement is 
quite straightforward) while the protection of the company’s intangible assets (copyrights, 
patents, etc.) is more difficult (Kumar et al. 2001). Nonetheless, those firms may face higher 
entry costs due costly initial investments. Vertical integration is measured by the ratio of value 
added to sales, where value added has been corrected for extraordinary positions.18
We also include the share of foreigners (Foreigners) in the population to control for 
cultural differences, such as entrepreneurial spirit, between natives and immigrants. Finally, 
following the findings of Carmignani and Giacomelli (2010) we use the number of lawyers per 
10,000 people (Lawyers) as a proxy of litigation intensity, since cheaper access to legal 
services may promote firm entry but it may also congest the courts
 This 
ratio is expected to be higher for vertically integrated firms because of their lower expenses in 
outside purchases of intermediate inputs. We first compute this ratio at the firm level and then 
we average it across firms. Regarding capital intensity, we first compute the firm-level capital 
intensity as the ratio of capital stock (tangible fixed assets plus inventories) to the number of 
employees and then we average it across firms.    
19
The impact of entry regulations and, in general, the regulatory environment is 
captured by our econometric exercise in several ways. Apart from including both fixed and 
time dummies, we included the variable ‘Regulation’ as a control. It is a proxy of product 
market regulation restrictiveness in the commercial sector at the regional level. The variable is 
taken from Matea and Mora-Sanguinetti (2012) and bears on the regulation of the following 
aspects: shop opening hours, seasonal sales, legal definitions of “large” retail outlets, regional 
licensing of hard discount stores, moratoria in retail trade licence issuance and specific taxes 
on large outlets.  
.   
Finally, regional fiscal regimes are controlled by the variable ‘Tax Pressure’ which 
approximates the tax burden on firms and entrepreneurs in each location. The variable is 
computed as the revenue from regional direct taxes as % of regional GDP. We selected direct 
taxes (e.g. income tax) because they are the ones that vary the most across Spanish 
regions20
Table 1 provides a description of all the variables used in our analyses, while Table 2 
displays their descriptive statistics.  
. A region (Comunidad Autónoma) may comprise one or more provinces.  
 
                                                                            
18. Extraordinary positions are revenues or expenses that do not arise from the regular activities of a firm, such as 
insurance claims. Using accounting identities, it can be shown that value added (i.e., revenue minus costs of 
intermediate inputs) can be computed as the sum of the profit per period, total labor expenses (including both salaries 
and benefits), taxes, depreciation expenses and interest expenses. To correct value added by extraordinary positions we 
subtract them from the previous sum.  
19. It would also seem appropriate to control for population density, since regions with high population density, as those 
with large metropolitan areas, normally attract more human capital. While it has been used in a number of experiments -
without changes in the results- it has finally been dropped because of the high correlation (0.81) with GDP.  
20. Alternatively, we also constructed tax pressure either with only revenue from indirect taxes or with all regional tax 
revenue. The results are robust to any of the definitions, as the three alternative variables display correlations among 
each other higher than 0.9.   
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Table 1: Description of variables 
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition Scale/units Period Source
Entry rate 
Number of firms (entrepreneurs) (corporations) that 
enter a market in a given year as a percentage of all the 
active firms (entrepreneurs) (corporations) in the market 
at the end of that year. 
% By province, 2001-2009 Spanish National Statistics 
Institute (INE)
Exit rate 
Number of firms (entrepreneurs) (corporations) that exit 
a market in a given year as a percentage of all the 
active firms (entrepreneurs) (corporations) in the market 
at the end of that year. 
% By province, 2001-2009
Spanish National Statistics 
Institute (INE)
Congestion Rate (ordinary)
Ratio between the sum of pending cases (measured at 
the beginning of the period ) plus new cases in a 
specific year and the cases resolved in the same year. 
Ordinary cases.
Fraction By province, 2001-2009
Consejo General del Poder 
Judicial (CGPJ)
GDP Current GDP  at market price Millions € By province, 2001-2009 INE (Regional accounts) 
Unemployment rate Percentage of total workforce who are unemployed and 
are looking for a paid job.
% By province, 2001-2009 La Caixa
Credit/GDP Loans to Spanish companies by Spanish financial 
institutions, divided by GDP. 
Fraction By province, 2001-2009 Bank of Spain and INE
Npl ratio
Ratio of non-performing loans to total banking loans 
(only to Spanish companies by Spanish credit 
institutions)
Fraction By province, 2001-2009 Bank of Spain
Dar/GDP Trade credit in arrears divided by GDP. Fraction By province, 2001-2009
Spanish National Statistics 
Institute (INE)
Branches Number of bank branches per 1,000 people. ‰ By province, 2001-2009 La Caixa
Weight 
primary/energy/manufactoring/construction/servic
es
Ratio of the gross value added of the main five 
industries (primary sector, energy, manufacturing, 
construction, services) over the total gross value added 
of each province
Fraction By province, 2001-2009 INE (Regional accounts) 
Capital intensity Average ratio of capital stock (tangible fixed assets 
plus inventories) to the number of employees
Fraction By province, 2001-2009 SABI
Vertical integration
Average ratio of value added to sales, where value 
added has been corrected for extraordinary positions Fraction By province, 2001-2009 SABI
Foreigners Share of foreigners in population. Fraction By province, 2001-2010 Fundación de las Cajas de 
Ahorros (FUNCAS)
Tax pressure Revenue from regional direct taxes as % of regional 
GDP
Fraction By region, 2001-2009 Regional Governments accounts 
and Bank of Spain
Lawyers  Number of lawyers inscribed in Bar associations per 
10,000 people.  
Per 10,000 By province, 2001-2009 Consejo General de la Abogacía
Regulation
Index (factor analysis) measuring the restrictiveness of 
the regulation (PMR) on retail trade. Index By region, 2001-2007
Mora-Sanguinetti and Llanos 
(2012)
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log(entry) 450 2.36 0.22 1.75 3.99
Log (entry entrepreneurs) 450 2.34 0.25 1.58 4.25
Log (entry corporations) 450 2.29 0.28 1.55 3.04
Log(exit) 450 2.22 0.22 1.49 3.21
Log (exit entrepreneurs) 450 2.40 0.22 1.70 3.43
Log (exit corporations) 450 1.68 0.36 0.48 2.94
Log (Congestion Ordinary) 450 0.75 0.24 0.31 1.69
Log (GDP) 450 17973.43 27686.95 1448.74 193049.50
Log (Unemployment rate) 450 1.80 0.38 0.88 2.87
Credit/GDP 450 0.52 0.22 0.19 1.52
Npl ratio 450 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.16
Dar/GDP 450 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08
Branches 450 1.05 0.26 0.54 1.85
Weight primary 450 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.23
Weight energy 450 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.18
Weight manufacturing 450 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.38
Weight construction 450 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.20
Weight services 450 0.64 0.07 0.50 0.84
Log (Capital intensity) 450 5.00 0.40 4.00 6.33
Vertical integration 450 0.37 0.02 0.31 0.44
Foreigners 450 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.24
Log(Tax pressure) 450 2.39 1.04 -0.65 4.38
Lawyers 450 19.38 6.55 7.75 51.19
Regulation 350 4.45 1.00 2.89 7.56
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3 Identification strategy 
We regress the entry and exit rates (for all firms, for entrepreneurs and for corporations)  on 
the congestion rate, province fixed effects, time dummies and a group of relevant controls (as 
explained in section 2.3). 
The estimates are obtained via the following specification:   
jt
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Where jtW  is either the entry rate or the exit rate (for all firms, for entrepreneurs or for 
corporations) in logs, jα  are province fixed effects, jtRateCongestion.  is the measure of 
judicial inefficacy in levels, kitControl is a set of K control variables (see section 3.2), td  are 
time dummies and the indices j , t  refer to the province and time period, respectively. Notice 
that this log-linear specification implies, if 0<β , that the entry (exit) rate is a decreasing and 
convex function of the congestion rate. In other words, if a province is extremely congested, 
further backlogs barely have an effect in the entry/exit decisions of firms, which seems a 
plausible assumption21.   The above regressions are estimated via the within-group estimator 
with clustered standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation22
We are not concerned about reverse-causality problems  between our key regressor, 
Congestion Rate, and the dependent variables, entry and exit rates, for several reasons. In 
the case of entry rates, we need to highlight, first, that reverse-causality could only take place 
if firms often litigated in their first year of life -in which they are registered as entries in our 
dataset- implying that they would increase court congestion. Second, conflicts related to 
companies’ entries may be solved in administrative courts (if the entrant has to challenge an 
administrative action) which are different from the general civil courts we analyze in this study.  
.  
In the case of exit rates, as before, we need to highlight that reverse-causality could 
only take place if firms litigated in their last year of life -in which they are registered as exits in 
our dataset-. In addition, conflicts regarding exits are generally resolved in courts different 
from the general civil courts analyzed in our database. Specifically, conflicts concerning layoffs 
are resolved by the employment tribunals (juzgados de lo social) while bankruptcy procedures 
are tried in specialized mercantile courts (juzgados de lo mercantil) since 200423
Even in the case that entry and exit rates had some impact on court congestion 
through an increase in litigation, we control for differences in litigation intensity across 
provinces by adding the variable “Lawyers” in some specifications. Finally, also notice that we 
.   
                                                                            
21. Nevertheless, log-log and linear-log specifications have also been fit, yielding similar results but a lower R-squared.  
22. The fixed effects have been found jointly significant via cross-section poolability tests, while cross-section correlation 
has been rejected using Pesaran’s CD test (2004). Serial correlation has been tested using the test of Wooldridge 
(2002). While this test has not been able to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, note that the power of this 
test may be low when N is small, as it is in this case (N=50). Drukker (2000) finds high power for samples between 
N=500 and N=1,000 and between T=5 and T=10. Tests results are available upon request. 
23.The current bankruptcy law (Ley Concursal), which entered into force in September 2004, established the creation of 
new courts (mercantile courts) that would be specialized in bankruptcy procedures. The procedures prior to that law 
were solved in the general civil courts.  
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know the sign of the reverse-causality bias in that case: we should expect a positive 
correlation between entry (exit) rates and congestion rates due to an increase in litigation. By 
contrast, since our estimates show a significant negative relationship in the case of entries 
and a non-significant negative relationship in the case of exits  (see section 4), our estimates 
would be the lower bound of the true casual impacts.  
Finally, the identification strategy relies on the time dummies and the province fixed 
effects to remove any omitted-variable bias. First, the entry and exit rates, the congestion 
rate, measures of macroeconomic performance (GDP, unemployment) and proxies of credit 
conditions (e.g. credit to GDP, non-performing loans ratio) are expected to be correlated 
along the business cycle. By including time dummies we control for this common factor. 
Second, entry rates and economic development are jointly determined by institutional factors 
and, more specifically, by regulations on entry (Djankov et al, 2002; Klapper et al, 2006). 
Although entry regulations and, in general, institutions, change slowly over time (and thus the 
province-fixed effects may capture them quite accurately in a short time period like the one 
used in our sample, 2001-2009), we have decided to control for the restrictiveness of the 
regulatory environment at the regional level by introducing the above mentioned variable 
‘Regulation’. Same can be said about taxation. Finally, since the main regulations governing 
exit, the labour law and the bankruptcy code, are set at the national level, we do not expect 
institutional factors to determine the geographical variation of entry rates, while any 
nationwide change in these laws would be captured by the time dummies.  
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4 Results  
Tables 3 to 8 display the impact of judicial (in)efficacy, as measured by the congestion rate of 
ordinary judgments (Congestion Ordinary), on entry and exit rates for the cases of 
entrepreneurs (defined as self-employed), limited liability corporations and for all firms (total 
entry/exit rates). Specification (1) only includes Congestion Ordinary, fixed effects and time 
dummies. Specification (2) adds to (1) a large set of controls, which is augmented in (3) and 
(4) by subsequently adding Lawyers and Regulation24
With respect to entry rates, the coefficient on Congestion Ordinary is negative and 
statistically significant in all the regressions where the dependent variable is the total entry 
rate (Table 3). However, when we differentiate the entries among those carried out by 
entrepreneurs (Table 4) and those by limited liability corporations (Table 5) notice that the 
negative impact is only significant in the first case. While the coefficients in Table 4 are 
always significant and equal or larger than those in Table 3, those in Table 5 are never 
significant and systematically much smaller. This finding may be explained by the fact that 
judicial (in)efficacy can be regarded as a fixed cost to be paid by the agents that litigate, so 
that it is expected to be a more important barrier to entry for entrepreneurs than for larger 
corporations.  
.   
Other controls, such as unemployment rate and proxies for credit availability, have 
the expected sign when significant: lower unemployment and a less risky credit market 
(lower npl ratios and less defaulted accounts receivable) are associated with higher entry 
rates. By contrast, ‘Tax pressure’ displays a surprisingly positive coefficient in some cases. 
However, most controls are not significant, as their impact is already captured by the fixed 
effects and the time dummies. In fact, the R-squared of the specifications with controls (2)-
(4) are only marginally higher than the one of specification (1), where only fixed effects and 
time dummies are included.  
We evaluate the size of the effect by means of a simple hypothetical experiment: 
attributing to the province with the worst judicial efficacy the best law enforcement in our 
sample25, the relative increase26
                                                                            
24. Correlations among the regressors, shown in Appendix E, suggest that there are no multicollinearity 
problems except for the case of Lawyers, so we only include this variable in some specifications. 
 in the entry rate of entrepreneurs would range between 5% 
and 7%, depending on the specification. Notice also that, as we control for credit availability 
in our regressions, we expect those figures to be the lower bound of the total impact of 
judicial efficacy on the entry rates of self-employed, since previous literature has found a 
positive effect of judicial efficacy on credit availability (Japelli et al., 2005, Fabbri, 2010) and a 
positive impact of credit availability on the entry rates of small firms (Aghion et al., 2007).  
Hence the effect is not only statistically significant but also economically relevant: judicial 
efficacy promotes entrepreneurship.  
25. The province with the best law enforcement (i.e., lowest value of Congestion Ratio) is Alava, with an 
average value of 1.65 for the period 2001-2009, while the province with the worst law enforcement (i.e. 
highest value of Congestion Ratio) is Alicante, with an average value of 2.80 for the same period. 
Therefore, the simulated change amounts to 1.65-2.80=-1.15. 
26. By relative change we mean 100*[X(1)-X(0)]/X(0), where X(0) and X(1) are the initial and final values, 
respectively. 
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Nevertheless, one could argue that there is an alternative interpretation of the results 
and that judicial efficacy does not really imply firm creation, but rather a “poaching effect” or 
an “attraction effect” to the most efficient provinces from the most inefficient ones. Firms 
could choose the location of their registered office in provinces with high judicial efficacy even 
if carrying out most of their business operations elsewhere. If so, the negative relation 
between entry and judicial inefficacy would be due to an “attraction effect”, rather than to real 
firm creation. But this effect is expected to take place in corporations, rather than in self-
employed businesses, due to the costs of such a strategy. But, as we find a negative relation 
between judicial inefficacy and entry in the case of entrepreneurs, but not in corporations, 
either an “attraction effect” does not exist or it’s too small to offset the fact that judicial 
efficacy has no impact on the creation of new companies.  
With respect to exit rates (Tables 6 to 8), the coefficient on “Congestion Ordinary” is 
never statistically different from zero, suggesting that judicial efficacy is not a determinant of 
the decision of firms (neither for corporations nor for entrepreneurs) to leave the market. By 
contrast, ‘Tax Pressure’ has a positive and significant impact on the exit rates of 
entrepreneurs, indicating that high direct taxes, such as the income tax, make self-employed 
leave the market. 
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Table 3: Impact of judicial efficacy on entry of all firms 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the entry rate of all firms (corporations, self-employed and other legal forms). 
All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for defaulted accounts receivable. 
Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated 
regression. The last column reports the average absolute value of the cross-section correlation coefficients of the 
regression residuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Congestion Ordinary -0.04* -0.05** -0.05** -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Log (GDP) 0.21 0.21 0.38
(0.29) (0.29) (0.36)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.15** -0.15** -0.14*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Credit/GDP 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Npl ratio -0.21 -0.17 -0.24
(0.27) (0.30) (0.59)
Dar/GDP -0.72 -0.68 0.38
(1.82) (1.79) (1.23)
Branches -0.32 -0.32 -0.25
(0.26) (0.26) (0.22)
Weight energy 0.18 0.21 -1.07
(0.80) (0.81) (0.73)
Weight manufacturing 0.16 0.16 -0.93
(0.66) (0.66) (0.89)
Weight construction 0.23 0.22 -0.28
(0.74) (0.73) (0.89)
Weight services 0.82 0.81 0.74
(0.59) (0.58) (0.67)
Log (Capital intensity) 0.05 0.05 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Vertical integration -1.16 -1.13 -1.20
(0.71) (0.72) (0.78)
Foreigners -0.33 -0.41 -0.49
(0.50) (0.55) (0.65)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lawyers -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Regulation 0.02
(0.01)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 450 450 450 350
R-squared (Within) 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.32
Log(entry)
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Table 4: Impact of judicial efficacy on entry of entrepreneurs 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the entry rate of entrepreneurs. All regressions include a constant. “Npl” 
stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for defaulted accounts receivable. Clustered standard errors below 
coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated regression. The last column reports the 
average absolute value of the cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p< 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES                 Log(entry entrepreneurs)
Congestion Ordinary -0.04* -0.05** -0.05* -0.06*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Log (GDP) 0.28 0.28 0.28
(0.31) (0.31) (0.40)
Log (Unemployment rate) 0.00 -0.00 -0.12
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09)
Credit/GDP 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Npl ratio 0.44 0.45 -0.10
(0.38) (0.40) (0.71)
Dar/GDP 0.43 0.44 1.38
(1.88) (1.86) (1.51)
Branches -0.23 -0.23 0.21
(0.34) (0.34) (0.26)
Weight energy -0.38 -0.37 -0.70
(0.97) (0.98) (0.95)
Weight manufacturing -0.37 -0.37 -1.26
(0.77) (0.77) (1.03)
Weight construction -1.02 -1.02 -0.79
(0.77) (0.77) (0.99)
Weight services -0.22 -0.23 0.38
(0.71) (0.71) (0.81)
Log (Capital intensity) 0.09* 0.10* 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Vertical integration -1.45* -1.45 -0.44
(0.86) (0.87) (0.87)
Foreigners -0.09 -0.11 0.15
(0.54) (0.61) (0.64)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.05* 0.05* 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Lawyers -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Regulation 0.03**
(0.01)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 450 450 450 350
R-squared (Within) 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.32
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Table 5: Impact of judicial efficacy on entry of corporations. 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the entry rate of corporations (limited liability companies). All regressions include a 
constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for defaulted accounts receivable. Clustered standard errors below 
coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated regression. The last column reports the average 
absolute value of the cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Congestion Ordinary -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log (GDP) 0.16 0.16 0.38
(0.35) (0.34) (0.39)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.31*** -0.32*** -0.21***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Credit/GDP 0.05 0.05 0.02
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Npl ratio -1.15*** -1.05** -0.71
(0.37) (0.41) (0.66)
Dar/GDP -2.34* -2.22* -1.52**
(1.30) (1.23) (0.61)
Branches -0.35 -0.35 -0.69**
(0.27) (0.26) (0.30)
Weight energy 0.57 0.64 -0.85
(1.08) (1.06) (1.05)
Weight manufacturing 0.93 0.93 0.13
(0.76) (0.76) (0.95)
Weight construction 1.51* 1.48* 1.04
(0.85) (0.83) (1.11)
Weight services 2.09*** 2.05*** 1.52**
(0.76) (0.75) (0.68)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.02 -0.01 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Vertical integration -0.67 -0.60 -2.21*
(1.15) (1.15) (1.17)
Foreigners -0.53 -0.75 -1.24
(0.70) (0.75) (0.76)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.03 0.02 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lawyers -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Regulation -0.01
(0.01)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 450 450 450 350
R-squared (Within) 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.34
Log(entry corporations)
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Table 6: Impact of judicial efficacy on exit of all firms 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the exit rate of all firms (corporations, self-employed and other legal forms). All 
regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for defaulted accounts receivable. 
Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated 
regression. The last column reports the average absolute value of the cross-section correlation coefficients of the 
regression residuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Congestion Ordinary -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Log (GDP) -0.20 -0.21 -0.44
(0.26) (0.26) (0.34)
Log (Unemployment rate) 0.07 0.08 0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.11)
Credit/GDP 0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Npl ratio 0.25 0.19 0.43
(0.35) (0.34) (0.53)
Dar/GDP -0.42 -0.49 -0.90
(2.13) (2.10) (2.06)
Branches 0.40* 0.39* 0.38
(0.21) (0.21) (0.30)
Weight energy 1.31 1.26 0.55
(0.99) (1.02) (1.29)
Weight manufacturing 0.97 0.97 0.51
(0.84) (0.85) (1.38)
Weight construction 1.16 1.18 0.67
(1.05) (1.06) (1.10)
Weight services 0.70 0.73 0.37
(0.64) (0.65) (0.88)
Log (Capital intensity) 0.08 0.08 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
Vertical integration -0.85 -0.89 -1.62
(1.01) (1.01) (1.60)
Foreigners 1.78** 1.91*** 2.08**
(0.69) (0.66) (0.81)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.08** 0.08** 0.07*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Lawyers 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
Regulation 0.01
(0.02)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 450 450 450 350
R-squared (Within) 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.22
Log(exit)
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Table 7: Impact of judicial efficacy on exit of entrepreneurs 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the exit rate of entrepreneurs. All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for 
non-performing loans and “Dar” for defaulted accounts receivable. Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The 
“within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated regression. The last column reports the average absolute 
value of the cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Congestion Ordinary -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Log (GDP) -0.20 -0.21 -0.29
(0.24) (0.24) (0.32)
Log (Unemployment rate) 0.10* 0.11* 0.09
(0.06) (0.06) (0.11)
Credit/GDP 0.06 0.06 0.09
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Npl ratio 0.37 0.28 0.87
(0.40) (0.39) (0.52)
Dar/GDP -0.34 -0.44 -0.45
(1.85) (1.81) (1.92)
Branches 0.27 0.26 0.23
(0.21) (0.21) (0.26)
Weight energy 1.02 0.96 -0.12
(0.98) (1.03) (1.28)
Weight manufacturing 1.05 1.05 0.61
(0.80) (0.81) (1.31)
Weight construction 0.84 0.86 0.14
(0.93) (0.95) (1.00)
Weight services 0.52 0.56 0.09
(0.58) (0.59) (0.83)
Log (Capital intensity) 0.09* 0.08 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
Vertical integration -0.69 -0.75 -0.96
(0.96) (0.97) (1.48)
Foreigners 2.08*** 2.27*** 2.15***
(0.67) (0.67) (0.76)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.09** 0.09** 0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Lawyers 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
Regulation 0.01
(0.02)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 450 450 450 350
R-squared (Within) 0.43 0.51 0.51 0.22
Log(exit entrepreneurs)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1405 
Table 8: Impact of judicial efficacy on exit of corporations 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the exit rate of corporations (limited liability companies). All regressions 
include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for defaulted accounts receivable. Clustered 
standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated regression. 
The last column reports the average absolute value of the cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression 
residuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Congestion Ordinary -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Log (GDP) -0.06 -0.07 -0.84
(0.43) (0.44) (0.57)
Log (Unemployment rate) 0.03 0.04 -0.05
(0.11) (0.11) (0.16)
Credit/GDP -0.05 -0.05 -0.12
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
Npl ratio -0.10 -0.17 -1.42*
(0.41) (0.46) (0.75)
Dar/GDP -2.44 -2.53 -3.88
(3.34) (3.30) (2.58)
Branches 0.69** 0.68** 1.25***
(0.28) (0.28) (0.46)
Weight energy 2.15 2.10 2.09
(1.63) (1.65) (1.77)
Weight manufacturing 0.43 0.43 -1.60
(1.40) (1.40) (1.95)
Weight construction 0.98 1.00 0.86
(1.82) (1.82) (1.99)
Weight services 0.91 0.94 0.27
(1.25) (1.25) (1.39)
Log (Capital intensity) 0.16** 0.16** 0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12)
Vertical integration -2.16 -2.22 -2.37
(1.67) (1.67) (2.20)
Foreigners 1.08 1.24 2.37*
(0.97) (0.93) (1.25)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.07 0.07 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Lawyers 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
Regulation -0.01
(0.03)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 450 450 450 350
R-squared (Within) 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.30
Log(exit corporations)
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5 Conclusions 
Entry of new firms is relatively low by international standards in Spain and entrepreneurship 
(defined in this study as the new businesses created by those “self-employed”) is also lower 
than in other countries with similar levels of development. 
Several factors affect entrepreneurship ranging from access to credit to market size. 
This study concentrates on the effects of the institutional environment. Specifically, we focus 
on the design and efficacy of the judicial system as the representative enforcement institution 
as it guarantees the application of regulation and private contracts. 
This study shows that more effective courts seem to promote the entry of 
entrepreneurs into the market in Spain. Attributing to the province with the worst judicial 
efficacy the best law enforcement in our sample, the relative increase in the entry rate of 
entrepreneurs would range between 5% and 7%, depending on the specification. 
We must emphasize, however, that judicial (in)efficacy seems to be an important 
barrier to entry for entrepreneurs, but not for corporations. This finding may be explained by 
the fact that access to justice can be regarded as a fixed cost to be paid by the agents that 
litigate, so that it is expected to have a larger influence on entrepreneurs than on larger firms.  
We should note that this is the first study on entrepreneurship which uses real judicial 
efficacy measures at the local level in Spain. That is, we used real data obtained directly from 
the courts to calculate our own measures of judicial efficacy. The data allow us to differentiate 
the efficacy of the judicial system by province and by type of procedure. 
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APPENDIX A: Size distribution of corporations and self-employed  
Following the classification of the European Commission (2003)27, we can measure firm size by 
number of employees and split any size distribution into four categories: micro firms (less than 
10 employees), small (between 10 and 49), medium (between 50 and 199)28
 
 and large (more 
than or equal to 200). According to the business register of the Spanish National Statistics 
Institute (period 2001-2009),  99.5% of the firms run by self-employed were micro firms, while 
this figure amounted to 85% in the case of corporations. Small firms accounted for 0.5% of the 
total self-employed businesses, while they were a 12.7% in the case of corporations. Finally, 
while there were neither medium nor large self-employed firms, there were a 1.8% of medium 
and a 0.4% of large corporations. Hence Spanish corporations are, on average, substantially 
larger than the businesses run by self-employed, as also shown in Figure A1.  
  Figure A1: Size distribution per legal form: average 2001-2009. 
 
SOURCE: DIRCE data from the National Statistics Institute (INE). Note: corporations are private or publicly quoted joint 
stock companies with limited liability for those owning shares. Self-employed are personally owned businesses with no 
limit to personal liability. Size in terms of number of employees: micro: [0,9]; small:[10,49]; medium: [50,199]; large: 200 
employees or more. 
 
                                                                            
27. Available in: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/ 
28. The exact classification of the European Commission uses 250 as the threshold between medium and large firms. 
Here we have to use 200 due to data constraints.  
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APPENDIX B: geographical and time distribution of entry rates 
Table B1: Entry rates all firms 
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration using DIRCE (Directorio Central de Empresas) data from the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
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Table B2: Entry rates entrepreneurs 
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration using DIRCE (Directorio Central de Empresas) data from the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
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Table B3: Entry rates corporations 
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration using DIRCE (Directorio Central de Empresas) data from the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
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APPENDIX C: geographical and time distribution of exit rates 
Table C1: Exit rate all firms 
SOURCE: Self elaboration using DIRCE (Directorio Central de Empresas) data from the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
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Table C2: Exit rate entrepreneurs 
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration using DIRCE (Directorio Central de Empresas) data from the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
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Table C3: Exit rate corporations 
 
  SOURCE: Self elaboration using DIRCE (Directorio Central de Empresas) data from the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
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APPENDIX D: Judicial Congestion rates (ordinary proceedings) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      SOURCE: self elaboration from Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ) data. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 MEAN
Alava 2,33 1,58 1,63 1,50 1,70 1,89 1,36 1,36 1,46 1,65
Albacete 3,21 1,72 1,81 1,72 1,66 1,72 1,90 2,49 2,29 2,06
Alicante 4,98 2,42 2,40 2,27 2,23 2,55 2,48 2,81 3,09 2,80
Almeria 3,90 2,13 1,99 2,13 2,05 2,32 2,35 2,70 3,05 2,51
Avila 3,83 1,82 1,71 1,69 1,52 1,65 1,63 2,20 1,67 1,97
Badajoz 2,49 1,68 1,64 1,65 1,69 1,88 1,89 2,20 2,27 1,93
Baleares 4,03 2,27 2,14 2,07 2,31 2,37 2,27 2,99 2,90 2,59
Barcelona 4,20 2,27 2,17 2,06 1,98 2,05 1,93 2,05 2,29 2,33
Burgos 2,97 1,75 1,86 1,76 1,68 1,86 1,74 1,94 1,81 1,93
Caceres 2,60 1,60 1,51 1,53 1,63 1,67 1,60 2,13 2,11 1,82
Cadiz 4,02 2,29 2,06 1,97 1,99 2,08 2,06 2,42 2,61 2,39
Castellon 4,28 2,42 2,18 2,17 2,17 2,28 2,35 2,56 2,87 2,59
Ciudad Real 3,09 2,07 1,99 2,02 2,06 2,02 2,11 2,71 2,44 2,28
Cordoba 3,80 1,84 1,93 1,79 1,73 1,71 1,78 2,02 2,46 2,12
La Coruña 4,24 2,24 2,09 1,90 1,85 2,12 2,11 2,11 2,09 2,30
Cuenca 3,06 1,92 1,77 2,12 1,81 2,14 2,19 2,50 2,49 2,22
Gerona 4,07 2,16 2,16 2,16 2,02 2,01 2,08 2,26 2,35 2,36
Granada 4,71 2,26 2,20 2,04 2,12 2,16 2,21 2,19 2,19 2,45
Guadalaja 3,15 2,01 2,22 2,09 1,87 1,89 2,03 2,05 2,48 2,20
Guipuzcoa 2,71 1,66 1,66 1,51 1,72 1,84 2,10 1,92 2,05 1,91
Huelva 3,73 2,02 1,98 1,94 2,04 2,23 2,38 2,31 2,54 2,35
Huesca 3,32 1,71 1,67 1,69 1,75 1,99 1,90 2,15 2,11 2,03
Jaen 2,94 1,74 1,83 1,83 1,91 2,23 1,87 1,95 2,00 2,03
Leon 2,94 1,76 1,67 1,61 1,68 1,62 1,71 2,08 1,80 1,87
Lerida 2,57 1,73 1,85 1,85 1,84 1,93 1,96 2,09 2,01 1,98
La Rioja 2,70 1,99 1,92 1,98 1,84 1,81 1,65 2,21 1,84 1,99
Lugo 3,08 2,01 1,77 1,64 1,72 1,67 1,68 1,64 1,89 1,90
Madrid 3,76 2,15 2,24 2,15 2,14 2,23 2,11 2,33 2,60 2,41
Malaga 3,88 2,32 2,34 2,15 2,21 2,46 2,46 2,62 2,98 2,60
Murcia 4,70 2,35 2,32 2,08 2,19 2,26 2,08 3,25 3,05 2,70
Navarra 2,86 1,88 1,83 1,84 1,58 1,54 1,48 1,72 1,87 1,84
Orense 3,12 1,99 1,86 1,93 1,84 1,74 1,78 2,10 2,24 2,07
Asturias 3,12 1,75 1,74 1,67 1,69 1,62 1,73 1,99 1,82 1,90
Palencia 2,16 1,67 1,53 1,42 1,50 1,82 1,74 2,01 1,97 1,76
Las Palma 5,02 2,45 2,21 2,21 2,30 2,59 2,73 2,80 2,83 2,79
Pontevedra 4,05 2,36 2,10 1,87 1,94 2,01 1,98 2,31 2,35 2,33
Salamanca 2,46 1,69 1,68 1,56 1,46 1,74 1,72 2,30 2,03 1,85
S.C.Tenerife 4,44 2,20 2,22 2,11 2,19 2,31 2,23 2,65 2,93 2,59
Cantabria 2,93 1,74 1,74 1,83 1,87 1,86 1,88 2,09 2,08 2,00
Segovia 3,14 1,58 1,82 1,74 1,66 1,73 1,90 2,60 2,10 2,03
Sevilla 4,53 2,09 2,10 1,84 1,94 2,09 2,25 2,78 3,07 2,52
Soria 2,86 1,70 1,64 1,56 1,67 1,73 1,46 2,10 1,78 1,83
Tarragona 5,37 2,35 2,24 2,01 1,98 2,11 1,99 2,22 2,32 2,51
Teruel 2,47 1,64 1,67 1,55 1,44 1,97 1,78 1,77 1,74 1,78
Toledo 3,72 2,06 1,88 2,03 2,03 2,17 2,34 3,15 3,14 2,50
Valencia 5,39 2,42 2,35 2,21 2,23 2,39 2,36 2,47 2,69 2,72
Valladolid 2,33 1,67 1,73 1,69 1,61 1,86 1,78 2,13 1,93 1,86
Vizcaya 3,69 1,76 1,84 1,88 1,84 1,93 1,67 1,49 1,69 1,98
Zamora 2,94 1,90 1,60 1,71 1,57 1,75 1,90 2,17 1,82 1,93
Zaragoza 2,99 1,82 1,85 1,82 1,67 1,71 1,66 1,75 2,04 1,92
MEAN 3,50 1,97 1,93 1,87 1,86 1,99 1,97 2,26 2,29 2,18
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APPENDIX E: Regressors’ correlation matrix (pairwise correlations). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration. 
Log (Congestion Ordinary) Log (GDP) Log (Unemployment rate) Credit/GDP Npl ratio Dar/GDP Branches Weight primary Weight energy
Log (Congestion Ordinary) 1
Log (GDP) 0.21 1
Log (Unemployment rate) 0.01 0.12 1
Credit/GDP -0.03 0.45 0.17 1
Npl ratio 0.15 0.05 0.45 0.14 1
Dar/GDP 0.14 0.26 0.13 0.33 0.26 1
Branches -0.20 -0.52 -0.48 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 1
Weight primary -0.11 -0.70 -0.08 -0.39 -0.02 -0.15 0.39 1
Weight energy -0.07 -0.16 0.06 -0.19 0.01 -0.03 0.08 -0.09 1
Weight manufacturing -0.12 0.04 -0.41 0.12 -0.19 0.04 0.21 -0.20 -0.14
Weight construction -0.17 -0.19 0.30 -0.03 0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.14
Weight services 0.28 0.52 0.36 0.21 0.19 0.07 -0.49 -0.44 -0.24
Log (Capital intensity) -0.08 0.47 0.20 0.68 0.13 0.24 -0.14 -0.52 -0.20
Vertical integration -0.10 0.37 0.31 0.47 0.35 0.15 -0.10 -0.58 0.05
Foreigners 0.11 0.38 -0.10 0.45 0.21 0.25 0.10 -0.34 -0.21
Lawyers 0.14 0.81 0.07 0.47 0.00 0.14 -0.43 -0.59 -0.22
Log(Tax pressure) -0.38 -0.43 -0.04 -0.04 0.13 -0.04 0.31 0.20 0.01
Regulation -0.24 0.11 -0.10 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 0.15 -0.12 0.04
Weight manufacturing Weight construction Weight services Log (Capital intensity) Vertical integration Foreigners Lawyers Log(Tax pressure) Regulation
Weight manufacturing 1
Weight construction -0.58 1
Weight services -0.65 0.11 1
Log (Capital intensity) 0.02 0.06 0.36 1
Vertical integration 0.16 -0.09 0.21 0.47 1
Foreigners -0.13 0.19 0.37 0.53 0.31 1
Lawyers 0.00 -0.26 0.54 0.44 0.28 0.21 1
Log(Tax pressure) 0.08 0.17 -0.27 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.37 1
Regulation -0.17 0.20 0.17 0.24 0.10 0.21 0.04 0.17 1
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